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Abstract 
In his interviews with Eckermann in the 1820s, Goethe referred to his Theory of 
Colours as his greatest and ultimate achievement.1 Its reception following publication in 
1810 and subsequent reviews throughout the history of physical science did not reflect 
this self-assessment. Even Hermann von Helmholtz, who in part modeled his scientific 
work after Goethe’s, initially thought that Goethe’s poetic genius prevented him from 
understanding physical science.2 Why did Goethe champion his Farbenlehre so ardently 
even years after it was dismissed by almost everyone else? In answering this question, 
this essay will attempt to add to the existing scholarship by considering Goethe’s Theory 
of Colours in the context of his natural philosophy, and generalizing the variety of 
objectifications of the concepts invoked by his colour theory and their relationships to 
Goethe’s epistemology and Newton’s mechanics. In this fashion, I attempt to show that 
the reason for Goethe’s self-assessment of his Theory of Colours is less enigmatic than 
appears from its examination solely as a work of physics. Rather, Zur Farbenlehre was 
the clearest expression of Goethe’s most universal archetype—polarity of opposites—
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which bridged Goethe’s conflicts with Kant’s and Spinoza’s epistemologies, and in an 
over-reaching way served as a cosmology underlying Goethe’s art and his science.  
Goethe’s Phenomenalism 
At least in its departure, Goethe’s Theory of Colours was a reaction to Newton’s 
Opticks. While Goethe recognized the popularity of Newtonian natural philosophy, he 
strongly objected to its widespread use. With respect to colour theory, Goethe believed 
that ‘Newton had based his hypothesis on a phenomenon exhibited in a complicated and 
secondary state’.3 He objected not so much to the abstract argumentation of rational 
mechanics, commenting that the ‘mathematician would willingly cooperate with us, 
especially in the physical department of the theory’,4 but rather to the ground premise of 
Newton’s approach. Goethe protested the destruction of phenomenal essence that 
occurred during the phenomenon’s ‘dissection into its component parts’.5 As a 
consequence of this irreducibility, 
the scientific minds of every epoch have also exhibited an urge to 
understand living formations as such, to grasp their outward, visible, 
tangible parts in context, to see these parts as an indication of what lies 
within and thereby gain some understanding of the whole through an 
exercise of intuitive perception.5 
 
In this way, Goethe sought to develop an understanding of objective, empirically 
accessible features of natural phenomena in their context in order to gain a subjective 
understanding of ‘what lies within’.5 
                                                 
3 J. W. von Goethe, Theory of Colours, (tr. C. L. Eastlake), Cambridge, 1994, iii.  
4 Goethe, op. cit. (3), lx. 
5 J. W. von Goethe, Scientific Studies, (tr. D. Miller), New York, 1988, 63. 
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Newton’s Reductionism 
In contrast, Newton’s purpose of Opticks was ‘not to explain the Properties of 
Light by Hypotheses, but to propose and prove them by Reason and Experiment’.6 Thus, 
Newton began with eight definitions of common optical terms (ray, incidence, etc), 
followed by eight axioms which state the principles of geometric optics (reflection, 
refraction, etc). Proposition I stated that ‘Lights which differ in Colour, differ also in 
Degrees of Refrangibility,’ as proved using a card, half of which was painted red and the 
other half blue, placed against a black background, and viewed through a prism.7 Having 
observed that the blue half of the card appeared lower than the red, Newton concluded 
that the colour blue ‘suffer[ed] a greater Refraction’ than the colour red.8 Proposition II 
stated that white light ‘consists of Rays differently Refrangible,’ as proved by using a 
circular aperture and a prism to project a beam of light onto a wall, and viewing the cast 
colour spectrum.9 The reduction of the phenomenon of colour to a mechanism inherent in 
light was summarized in the following definition from the Opticks: 
Colours in the Object are nothing but a Disposition to reflect this or that 
sort of Rays more copiously than the rest; in the Rays they are nothing but 
their Dispositions to propagate this or that Motion into the Sensorium, and 
in the Sensorium they are Sensations of those Motions under the Forms of 
Colours.10  
 
                                                 
6 I. Newton, Opticks, New York, 1952, 1. 
7 Newton, op. cit. (6), 20. 
8 Newton, op. cit. (6), 21. 
9 ‘The image … was coloured, being red at its least refracted end, and violet at its most 
refracted end, and yellow green and blue in the intermediate Spaces.’ Newton, op. cit. (6), 
26. 
10 Newton, op. cit. (6), 125. 
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Newton provided a mechanism for the creation of colour with its essential components 
being contained in light as an object, instead of functioning in the Sensorium of the 
subject, or instead of the interaction between light and its perceived and intuited effect. It 
is precisely this abstraction of concepts from intuition by Newton that Helmholtz 
attributed as the cause of Goethe’s passionate rejection of the Newtonian doctrine of 
colour.11 For Goethe, Newton’s explanation was unacceptable because it failed to explain 
why this mechanism (of motion) was related to our particular modes of perception, and 
should give rise to colour at all.  
Goethe’s Reverence of the Natural Object 
In contrast to Newton’s, Goethe’s natural philosophy was not interested in the 
decomposition of phenomena into their causal processes, either mechanical or 
genealogical. Rather, Goethe sought ‘conditions under which phenomena appear; their 
consistent succession, their eternal return under thousands of circumstances [and] their 
uniformity and mutability’.12 This ‘mistrust of abstraction’13 was an expression of 
Goethe’s reverence of the natural object. Providing direction, this guide warned against 
the idealization of Nature by the natural philosopher who ‘should be careful not to 
transform perceptions into concepts, concepts into words, and then treat these words as if 
they were objects’.14  
                                                 
11 Helmholtz, op. cit. (2), 403.  
12 Goethe, op. cit. (5), 25. 
13 J. Barnouw, ‘Goethe and Helmholtz: Science and Sensation’, in Goethe and the 
Sciences: A Reapraisal (eds. F. Amrine, F. J. Zucker, H. Wheeler), Boston, 1987, 56. 
14 Goethe, op. cit. (3), liii. 
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The primacy of the natural object had a dual foundation. Both were what Goethe 
would have termed the historical determinants of his life. On one hand, the primacy of 
the natural object stemmed epistemologically from Goethe’s Spinozistic monism in 
identifying Nature and God.15 On the other hand, it may have been related politically to 
Goethe’s aversion to the French Revolution, seeing it as a tragic and terrifying 
idealization of the social world by the body politic, and fearing an analogous idealization 
of the natural world by science.16 The potentially deceptive nature of judgment saw its 
expression in Goethe’s belief that the modern age tended to be scientifically inaccessible 
and abstruse. As he pointed out:  
We remove ourselves from common sense without opening up to a higher 
one; we become transcendent, fantastic, fearful of intuitive perception in 
the real world, and when we wish to enter the practical realm, or need to, 
we suddenly turn atomistic and mechanical.17 
 
As such, sanctioning the priority of conceptual knowledge over the intuitive would have 
terrorizing consequences for understanding of the natural world, much like the unchecked 
pursuit of social ideals did during the French Revolution. Thus, Goethe wrote that he 
himself had initially accepted Newton’s theory of white light until a particular experience 
brought him to his senses and to an understanding firmly grounded in intuition.18  
                                                 
15 G. Floistad, ‘Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge and the Part-Whole Structure of Nature’, 
in Spinoza on Knowledge and the Human Mind, (ed. Y. Yovel), 2 vols., Leiden, 1994, i, 
45-67. 
16 G. Brande, Wolfgang Goethe, (tr. A. W. Porterfield), 2 vols., New York, ii, 29-41. 
17 Goethe, op. cit. (5), 309. 
18 Barnouw, op. cit. (13), 67. 
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Light and Eye: The Proximal Prism Experiment 
In addition to Goethe’s natural philosophy being defined by its reverence of the 
natural object, it is just as critically characterized by its development of a holistic 
understanding of phenomena. In this way, it was related both to the psycho-physical 
parallelism of Spinoza, as well as to the dependence of intuition on the functions of the 
mind, as developed by Kant.  
Thus, Goethe sought to capture the universal essence of the objective world in the 
particular way of a subjective world-view. Writing in the Italian Journey, Goethe 
remarked about wishing to make a journey to India, ‘not for the purpose of discovering 
something new, but in order to view in [his] way what has [already] been discovered’.19 
Thus, for Goethe, as well as his colour theory, it was the way of seeing, and seeing in a 
very particular way, that organized the features of the objective experience of Nature.20  
As a result, when Goethe saw that the prismatic colours appeared to the eye only 
at the boundaries of white and black, he recognized that a colour theory rooted in the 
properties of light must be inadequate. Goethe observed that there must be both light and 
dark, as well as a proximally positioned eye, in order for colour to arise. In one of his 
experiments, Goethe observed a card, half which was painted black, the other half white, 
using two orientations of the card. As Bortoft described, ‘holding the prism so that it is 
oriented like the roof of a house turned upside down, with edges parallel to the 
boundaries [Goethe] look[ed] through the slanted side facing [him] toward the card’.21  In 
                                                 
19 R. Steiner, Goethe the Scientist, New York, 1950, 1. 
20 H. Bortoft, The Wholeness of Nature: Goethe’s Way Toward a Science of Conscious 
Participation in Nature, New York, 1996, 34. 
21 Bortoft, op. cit. (19), 40. 
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the orientation with the black half on top, the colour spectrum appears in the white zone 
near the boundary, beginning with red, proceeding to orange, and ending with yellow 
farther from the boundary. In the orientation with the black half on the bottom, careful 
examination reveals that the colour spectrum appears in the black region at the boundary: 
first light blue, then dark blue, and finally purple the farthest away. Placing the prism 
next to the eye and observing a white wall yields nothing in the way of colour. Similarly, 
projecting a beam of white light through the prism and casting it on a wall some distance 
away, although produces a colour spectrum, produces a very different one described by 
Newton,9 and an eye placed close to the prism is necessary to observe the phenomenon 
exactly as Goethe described it. Physically, this is due to the relatively shorter focal length 
that results from the proximal placement of the prism, as compared to Newton’s 
experiment, in which the light refracted from a prism is cast onto a wall, some eighteen 
feet away. More importantly, this illustrates Goethe’s dedication to the ‘combination of 
subjective and objective experiments’ to arrive at the whole of the phenomenon.22 This 
was motivated by the goal of understanding the whole phenomenon of colour, including 
aspects examined by Newton, as well as those that are classified as subjective colour 
phenomena, such as colour mixing and after-images.23 In this way, both light and eye 
were directly involved in the perception of colour.  
Totalization: The Distal Prism Experiment 
Moreover, Goethe criticized Newton’s experiment used to prove the second 
proposition of refrangibility of colour rays for the limitations it imposed on experimental 
                                                 
22 Goethe, op. cit. (3), 147. 
23 Goethe, op. cit. (3), liii. 
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variability, and consequently, upon the natural philosopher. Whereas Newton observed 
the colour spectrum cast on a wall at a fixed distance away from the prism, Goethe 
observed the cast spectrum on a white card which was progressively moved away from 
the prism.24 When the card was close to the prism, analogous to the proximal positioning 
of the eye, the cast image was mostly white and circular, e.g., ‘Refraction without the 
Appearance of Colour’.23 As the card was moved away, the projected image elongated, 
gradually assuming an elliptical shape, and the coloured images became larger, finally 
merging at the center to produce green. Moving the card farther led to the increase in the 
size of the image, until finally the spectrum described by Newton in the Opticks was 
produced.25 However, moving the card still farther led to the abrogation of the image, and 
the production of an oblong form consisting of violet, green, and orange. The image cast 
by the refracted beam was not fixed, but rather developed with increasing distance from 
the prism.26 Consequently, Goethe saw the particular distance chosen by Newton to prove 
the second proposition of the Opticks as capriciously imposed.  
In contrast to Newton, Goethe advanced a natural philosophy that sought to 
integrate all of the manifestations of a natural phenomenon. Thus, formulation of general 
laws regarding the function of natural phenomena was accomplished by the totalization 
of the phenomenal world of experience and experiment as to include all existent 
                                                 
24 Goethe, op. cit. (3), 127-38. 
25 It is interesting to note that this depiction of Newton’s spectrum is slightly in error due 
to the appearance of colour blue, and is likely a result of Goethe’s consultation with 
Erxleben’s Anfrangsgründe der Naturlehre, instead of Newton’s original description. D. 
Sepper, Goethe, Newton, and Color: The Background and Rationale for an Unrealized 
Scientific Controversy, (Ph. D. diss. AAT T-27972), The University of Chicago, 1981. 
26 N. Ribe, ‘Goethe’s Critique of Newton: A Reconsideration’, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science (1985), 16, 315-35. 
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variations and consistencies of natural forms. For Goethe, it is by way of this integration 
that the inherently finite domain of human experience could mix with the infinity of 
Nature. 
A Gap: Knowledge Seeking and Intuitive Perception 
Goethe’s colour theory was thus a phenomenology of colour, rather than an 
explanatory mechanism per se. Nevertheless, Goethe considered mechanics to be an 
intrinsic part of scientific inquiry. Consistent with such a view, he distinguished four 
types of cognitions, with their associated types of metaphysical organizations of human 
experience. Among the four were the knowledge seekers and the intuitively perceptive. 
The former were obliged to have a ‘quiet, objective gaze, restless curiosity, and clear 
understanding’.27 In this fashion, they were true Spinozists, striving after the objective 
reality and ‘ideas which are true’ in their equivalence with Nature.28 On the other hand, 
the latter were quite Romantic, defined by their subjective faculties, and accessing Nature 
through their sense-impressions. The duality that existed between the objective and 
subjective components of truth, as polarized by these metaphysical distinctions, was 
bridged by Goethe’s genetic method, making the ‘relationship of the two [cognition 
types] clear and useful’.29 Thus, Goethe concluded: 
If I look at the created object, inquire into its creation, and follow this 
process back as far as I can, I will find a series of steps. Since these are not 
actually seen together before me, I must visualize them in my memory so 
that they form a certain ideal whole. At first I will tend to think in terms of 
steps, but nature leaves no gaps, and thus, in the end, I will have to see this 
                                                 
27 Goethe, op. cit. (5), 74. 
28 B. de Spinoza, Correspondence, (tr. R. H. M. Elwes), New York, 1955, 361. 
29 Goethe, op. cit. (5), 75. 
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progression of uninterrupted activity as a whole. I can do so by dissolving 
the particular without destroying the impression itself’.28 
 
In this way, Goethe’s science existed on the ‘borderline’ of objective ‘knowledge 
seeking’ and subjective ‘intuitive perception’.26 In fact, Goethe asserted that strict 
Spinozism was not fruitful, as the ‘seekers of knowledge,’ who look at Nature with a 
quiet, objective gaze ‘may cross themselves and bless themselves against imagination as 
often as they wish—before they know it, they will have to call on imagination’s creative 
power to help’.26 
Methodology: Genetic and Comparative Methods 
This interest in the phenomenon’s genesis and mechanism was transient and 
valuable only heuristically. The phenomenon’s creation was understood by using the 
genetic and comparative methods, in the process of synthesizing the various sense-
impressions of the object, but ultimately the ontogeny was made implicit, as the whole of 
the phenomenon was generated ideally. This genetic submergence was another 
expression of Goethe’s Spinozism, since the phenomenon’s genesis cannot be seen in 
Nature, as ‘nature leaves no gaps.’28 The creation, therefore, although made explicit 
during the mediation between object and subject, must ultimately be made implicit in 
imitation of Nature. Upon the conclusion of the genetic method, one was left with the 
‘ideal whole,’ the form of the object’s archetype.  
The content of the archetype was obtained by using the comparative method, 
which ‘teaches us what parts are common’.30 This was accomplished by observing the 
phenomenon in a wide variety of its natural objectifications, comparing these 
                                                 
30 Goethe, op. cit. (5), 118. 
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observations to arrive at the invariant features and to synthesize them together. Although 
the stable features of the archetype were obtained by using the comparative method, 
synthesizing the plurality of empirical observations—‘the idea [genetic form] must 
govern the whole’—and the genetic method provided the organization of the archetypal 
features obtained with the comparative method.29 The whole of Goethe’s scientific 
approach was made up by the combination of the genetic and comparative methods, with 
the latter providing the objective component, empirically complementing the subjective 
part which idealized to form the archetypal whole.  
Goethe’s way of observing required one to look into an object, and see behind 
one’s intuition: ‘to arrange things in order is a large and difficult undertaking [and] 
requires far more than sensory observation and memory’.31 The missing link was ‘insight 
into its [object’s] character [and] striving of the human spirit’.30 This mode of observation 
stretched from the phenomenal world into the noumenal one, in contrast to the Kantian 
assertion of the mediation of noumena by sense-impressions. Such reaching towards the 
objective was not strictly Spinozist either, since Goethe’s encounter with the object 
became internalized and imagined, in stark contrast to Spinoza’s view of imagination as a 
corruptor of true knowledge. The visualization of Goethe’s genetic method thus involved 
seeing behind one’s intuition and extending into the noumenal world, reversing the 
process, and imagining as the objective world stretched back across the subject-object 
boundary.  
By means of this ‘exact sensorial imagination,’ the natural philosopher visualized 
the observation of the phenomenon, e.g., experimenting with the prism, and integrated all 
                                                 
31 Goethe, op. cit. (5), 73. 
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the various aspects of the phenomenon. Thus, the natural philosopher ‘recreated in the 
wake of ever-creating nature’.32 The goal of this process was to form an interjective 
organ of perception which could provide the natural philosopher with a deeper intuition 
of an object—yielding intuition of its essence and its organization—a goal impossible to 
achieve by simply observing an object or merely contemplating over it. In this way, the 
higher phenomenon did not appear to the senses. Instead, it was discovered within the 
sensory.  
In his 1853 lecture ‘On Goethe’s Scientific Researches,’ Hermann von Helmholtz 
asserted hat Goethe’s ‘theory of colours [was] an attempt to save the immediate truth of 
sense impression from the attacks of science’.33 While it was true that Goethe’s 
epistemology assigned critical importance to the role of intuition, Goethe was far more 
concerned with the mediate value of sense impressions. In the Theory of Colours, he 
directly rejected the idea that it was possible to have perceptions without theoretical 
constructions: 
Every act of seeing leads to consideration, consideration to reflection, 
reflection to combination, and thus it may be said that in every attentive 
look on nature we already theorise. But in order to guard against the 
possible abuse of this abstract view, in order that the practical deductions 
we look to should be really useful, we should theorise without forgetting 
that we are so doing, we should theorise with mental self-possession, and, 
to use a bold word, with irony.34 
 
In this way, we were to impose our concepts onto Nature, but as natural philosophers we 
were to pre-empt this capacity. Thus, Goethe’s scientific method did not divorce 
                                                 
32 Bortoft, op. cit. (19), 42. 
33 Helmholtz, op. cit. (2), 12. 
34 Goethe, op. cit. (3), xl-xli. 
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understanding of the phenomenon from the empirical reality of the phenomenon itself. 
By using the exact sensorial imagination, formulation of a hypothesis allowed the natural 
philosopher to cross from the world of empirical experience into the world of imagined 
concepts and back, in a delicate balance of precept and concept, but not localized to 
either one exclusively.   
Thus, Goethe conceived three types of colour, characterized by varying degrees of 
the role of the subject in their experience, as reflected in the temporality of their 
perception.35 By bridging the distinctions among these different colour types, and 
intuiting them in an ‘unbroken series,’ the natural philosopher thus developed a non-
reductionistic view of the whole phenomenon.36 The form of the recreated unity as 
obtained by using the genetic method did not reside in Nature, but persisted only in the 
natural philosopher’s imagination during the synthetic process. As such, this was a 
fundamental basis for Goethe’s discontent with Newtonian mechanics. Imaginative 
recreation of natural processes included a rational and mechanistic re-tracing of the 
process. But it recapitulated the unconscious purposiveness of Nature, in which the 
natural philosopher saw its telos, without bestowing on it a telic basis.  
On Goethe’s Interjective metaphysics and Its Hybrid Nature 
The relationship between Kant’s third critique,37 and specifically its prescriptions 
for the use of teleological judgment in biology, and Goethe’s phenomenalism and its use 
                                                 
35 Goethe conceived of three types of colour: physiological, physical, and chemical; as 
originating in the eye, colorless media, and particular substances, respectively. Such a 
classification was based on the permanence of the perception of colour: fleeting, passing, 
and permanent, respectively. Goethe, op. cit. (3), lv. 
36 Goethe, op. cit. (3), lvi. 
37 I. Kant, Critique of Judgment, (trans. J. C. Meredith), Oxford, 1952. 
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of teleology, are notable. Indeed, Goethe followed the Kantian course, conceiving final 
causes in Nature, but attributing no epistemic relevance to them as such, and thereby 
ascribing no telic functions to Nature. Goethe’s metaphysics, however, although Kantian 
in some ways, was quite distinct in others. Specifically, Goethe uniquely hybridized 
Spinoza’s and Kant’s views, in such a way as to avoid the crisis of duality inherent in 
Kantian metaphysics, and the inadequacy of Spinoza’s exclusive attention to the object 
and the dismissal of the productive role of imagination in the generation of knowledge. 
As such, Goethe was neither a strict Kantian, nor a true Spinozist.  
Goethe began his Preface to the 1810 edition of the Theory of Colours by 
asserting that ‘it [was] useless to attempt to express the nature of a thing abstractedly’.38 
He then added: ‘Effects we can perceive, and a complete history of these effects would 
sufficiently define the nature of the thing itself.’ Goethe was exposed to the Kantian 
contradiction inherent in such a view by Schiller, but failed to understand its 
metaphysical significance.39 Nevertheless, two somewhat opposing aspects of this 
assertion are notable: i) that phenomena were discussed in terms of their effects on us; 
and ii) that such a phenomenal description could yield the nature of things in themselves, 
independent of our intuition of them. The Kantian distinction between object and subject, 
between noumena and phenomena, and between outer and inner worlds was thus 
problematized in terms of the gap that exists between these entities, and in terms of its 
impassability in Kantian metaphysics.  
                                                 
38 Goethe, op. cit. (3), xxxvii. 
39 R. J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of 
Goethe, Chicago, 2002, 421-34. 
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Respecting his Spinozistic dispositions and their Naturism, Goethe set absolute 
priority to Nature and the objective world, and the influence which these had over the 
natural philosopher and his subjective faculties. ‘Empirical evidence carries (and should 
carry) the greatest weight,’ Goethe wrote, as Nature was ‘a source of creation from the 
deepest depths to the loftiest heights’.40 However, in this endeavor, Goethe recognized 
the role of the subject. Thus, Nature’s essence was obtained by way of the imagination, 
which allowed the natural philosopher to imaginatively recreate natural processes, 
integrating their diverse phenetic qualities with the implicit understanding of their 
mechanism. However, this was done without losing sight of the primacy of Nature in 
determining the content of scientific theories. This use of the imagination was somewhat 
analogous to the Kantian imaginative syntheses, and the synthesis of apperception in 
particular,41 but it was in stark contrast to the role of imagination in Spinoza’s theory of 
knowledge,42 which, if involved, in fact led to the formulation of false ideas.27  
Although the role of the imagination and the subjective faculties of the mind in 
the ability to experience the world was quite Kantian, the fact that Goethean metaphysics 
allowed for the attainment of objective knowledge was not. This distinction was a source 
of disagreements between Schiller and Goethe, and was particularly manifest in Goethe’s 
exclamation that he himself had ‘ideas without knowing [them], and can even see them 
with [his] own eyes’.36 The basic assumption of the Kantian view was that a posteriori 
elements in knowing the world were contingent on the particular a priori mode of our 
                                                 
40 Goethe, op. cit. (5), 12. 
41 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, (trans. N. K. Smith), New York, 1969. 
42 B. de Spinoza, Ethics, (trans. R. H. M. Elwes), New York, 1955. 
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experience, and that only the pure elements were apodeictic. Although Goethe also 
considered that there were such a priori elements in our cognition, he characteristically 
distinguished his epistemology from Kant’s by asserting that through experience, and 
consequently through intuition, it was possible to develop a way of knowing the world 
outside of the particulars of experience. As Goethe’s archetypes were universally 
applicable, such an approach accessed the natural world not only phenomenally, but also 
noumenally.  
Insofar as the outer world caused the inner world, this aspect of Goethe’s thought 
was also consistent with Spinoza’s views, as Goethe held that ‘cause and effect must 
have a closer tie to one another than contiguity in space and time, [and that] they must be 
of a common qualitative kind’.43 As Hegge noted, this view was similarly formulated by 
Spinoza: ‘Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by 
means of the other’.38 Indeed, such an integrated world-view was inherent in the 
integration of Nature and self that characterized Romantic thought.44  
Thus, Goethe’s metaphysics and epistemology were a hybrid of his Kantian and 
Spinozistic dispositions, positing the I interjectively at the interface of object and subject 
with a possibility of accessing things-in-themselves. In this light, Goethe’s remark to 
Eckermann is particularly interesting: ‘Kant never took any notice of me, although 
independently I was following a course similar to his’.45 It can thus be suggested that 
                                                 
43 H. Hegge, ‘Theory of Science in the Light of Goethe’s Science of Nature’, Inquiry 
(1990), 15, 363-86. 
44 Richards, op. cit. (36), 511-14. 
45 E. Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant, and Goethe, (tr. J. Gutmann, P. O. Kristeller, J. H. 
Randall, Jr.), 5 vols., Princeton, 1963, iii, 372. 
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Goethe’s natural philosophy with its interjective moment succeeded at avoiding the crisis 
of post-Kantian metaphysics.46 
Goethe’s Cosmology and the Pervasiveness of the Polar Archetype 
In addition to the totalization of science with respect to Nature, Goethe’s Theory 
of Colours served another very important purpose. This goal reached to the opposite side 
of the object-subject interface, away from Nature, and towards Goethe, the natural 
philosopher. Specifically, Goethe saw the phenomenon of colour as a subject for the 
exegesis of his polar cosmology, employing colour on the basis of ‘its close analogy [to 
the cosmological archetype] ... as equivalent [to it]’.47  
Goethe’s colour theory was another expression of the ultimate and highest 
archetype, that of unity of opposing forces. Introducing his Theory of Colours, Goethe 
wrote: ‘to apply these designations [e.g., colour expressions of the cosmological 
archetype], this language of Nature to the subject we have undertaken; to enrich and 
amplify this language by means of the theory of colours and the variety of their 
phenomena, and thus facilitate the communication of higher theoretical views [of this 
cosmology], was the principal aim of the present treatise’.48 These higher theoretical 
views permeated and over-reached the totality of Nature, as ‘with light poise and 
counterpoise, [She] oscillates within her prescribed limits: now as a simple repulsion and 
                                                 
46 J. Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, (tr. W. Hohengarten), Cambridge, 1996, 10-
57.  
47 Goethe, op. cit. (3), xxxix. 
48 Goethe, op. cit. (3), xxxix-xl. 
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attraction, now as an upsparkling and vanishing light, as undulation in the air, as 
commotion in matter, as oxydation and deoxydation’.49  
In this way, Goethe described magnetism, colour, wave theory, mechanics, and 
chemistry as all being expressions of one internally balanced and counterbalanced action 
of Nature.50 Goethe’s Maxims and Reflections expressed the universality and the 
supremacy of the polar archetype even more explicitly: 
Genesis and decay, creation and destruction, birth and death, joy and pain, 
all are interwoven with equal effect and weight; thus even the most 
isolated event always presents itself as an image and metaphor for the 
most universal.51 
 
The pro- and contra- polarity inherent in Goethe’s episteme was particularly apparent in 
his morphological writings. In describing how the archetype’s expression was subject to 
the constraints of nature, Goethe brought up an example of the evolution of water- and 
air-borne organisms, and compared the two in terms of the inverse play-off of features 
which are ultimately balanced to yield a harmonious species: 
Water has a marked bloating effect on bodies it surrounds, touches, or 
penetrates to some degree. Thus the body of the fish, and especially its 
flesh, is swollen in conformity with the laws of the element. According to 
the laws of the archetype, this swelling of the body must be followed by a 
contraction of the extremities or auxiliary organs, not to mention further 
limitations of other organs. 
 
                                                 
49 Goethe, op. cit. (3), xxxviii-xxxix. 
50 Goethe’s cosmology may have an intriguing relationship with Schelling’s natural 
philosophy, which stood in opposition to the Newtonian view of matter constituted by 
static particles, and instead asserted that matter is an equilibrium of dynamic forces that 
engage in ‘polar opposition’ to one another. F. W. J. von Schelling, Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature, (tr. E. Harris, P. Heath), Cambridge, 1988, 9-42.  
51 Goethe, op. cit. (5), 304. 
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The air, by absorbing water, has a drying effect. Hence the archetype 
developed in the air will be as inwardly dry as the air is pure and lacking 
in moisture, giving rise to a more or less lean bird. Enough material will 
be left over for the formative force to clothe flesh and bone in rich array, 
and outfit the auxiliary organs fully. What in the fish was used for flesh is 
here left over for the feathers.52 
 
Here the expression of the polar archetype as the formative force was applied to the 
morphological development of fish and birds, so that the effect of the aqueous 
environment on the fish was opposed by the contraction of its extremities, and the drying 
effect of air on birds was inversely neutralized by production of feathers. The formative 
force thus pushed forward only to be met with the counterbalance of natural constraints to 
create a harmonious organism. The polar archetype was related to the pure phenomenon 
of the opposition between light and dark as well. Writing in On Morphology, Goethe 
speculated: 
Plants and animals in their least perfect [initial ontogenic] state are 
scarcely to be differentiated. Hardly perceptible to our senses, they are a 
pinpoint of life, mutable, or semimutable. Are these beginnings—
determinable in either direction—destined to be transformed by light into 
plant, or darkness into animal?53 
 
In addition to the polarity that existed between plants and animals, there also existed a 
polarity within: 
The lower position is occupied by the root which works into the earth, belongs to 
the moisture and to the darkness. The stem, the trunk, or whatever may serve in its 
place, strives upward in exactly the opposite direction, toward the sky, the light, 
and the air.48 
 
                                                 
52 Goethe, op. cit. (5), 122. 
53 Goethe, op. cit. (5), 65. 
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Goethe recognized the mystical nature of this question, since he ‘would not trust 
[himself] to answer no matter how well [he is] supported with relevant observations and 
analogies’.48 However, the mere inception of this question demonstrated the depth and 
breadth of Goethe’s polar cosmology, which over-reached the totality of natural 
phenomena, from plants to animals, in the form of light and dark.54  
The cosmological polarity of plants and animals was further related to the polarity 
of freedom and necessity: ‘Plants attain their final glory in the tree, enduring and rigid, 
while the animal does so in man by achieving the highest degree of mobility and 
freedom’.48 This was the interplay of freedom and necessity, as playing a role in the 
development of the self, in the process of which growth was attained by the 
counterbalance between life’s determinism, insofar as the self cannot escape the 
circumstances of its inception, and one’s will, which allowed the self to cultivate itself 
through interaction with the world.55 In this way, the life of a plant was polarized toward 
the determinism of growth, and that of a man toward the freedom present in it. All of 
Goethe’s thought, be it with regard to the personal formation of the self, morphological 
development, or ultimately colour, was united by a single over-reaching archetype, the 
clearest expression of which was the phenomenon of colour, and the inherent opposition 
between and unity of light and dark in its production. 
                                                 
54 For a discussion of the relationship between Goethe’s science and political economy, 
see M. Jackson, ‘Natural and Artificial Budgets: Accounting for Goethe’s Economy of 
Nature’, Science in Context (1994), 7, 409-31. 
55 J. W. von Goethe, From My Life: Poetry and Truth, (tr. R. R. Heitner), 2 vols., 
Princeton, 1994, i, 17, 44-45, 173-174, 241. 
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Conclusion: Reaching to Span the Poles of a Rainbow 
The polar archetype of opposition and attraction over-reached not only Goethe’s 
natural philosophy, but also his philosophical influences, bridging Goethe’s Spinozistic 
and Kantian dispositions, as well as their internal frameworks. Thus, Goethe’s genetic 
method, which in addition to standing on the borderline of object and subject, uniting 
these opposing Kantian entities, did so by simultaneously negating and embracing 
Spinoza’s views of imagination and objectivism, respectively.  
Insofar as Mephistopheles represented Goethe’s belief that the original Light had 
the most important function in the cosmos—to be the mediator between ‘spirit’ and 
‘matter—‘ Goethe’s theory of colour assumed a monumental importance.56 As 
Pendlebury wrote: ‘Newton set up a theory of light and incidentally of colour, which was 
apparently so conclusive, so successful, that it tended to exclude further investigation of 
the phenomena out of which the theory was carefully (and selectively) built up’.57 This 
suppression of the creative and learning process—the cessation of growth—was precisely 
what incited Goethe to take such an opposing stance against Newton’s wave theory.  
Goethe saw in the popularity and dominance of Newtonian reductionism not only 
its explicit imposition on and irreverence of Nature, but more importantly, an actual act 
of imprisonment of the will, the same will to which he referred as part of the ‘missing 
link’ in relating to Nature. Thus, with the Theory of Colours Goethe set out to free this 
noble will, as one would free a ‘princess’ from a tower,54 and render man free, not 
ontologically as Schiller, Fichte, and the other Jena Romantics surrounding Goethe 
                                                 
56 J. W. von Goethe, Faust, (tr. D. Luke), Oxford, 1987, 42. 
57 D. Pendlebury, ‘The Scientific Activity of J. W. von Goethe’, Systematics (1965), 3, 
93-123. 
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sought to do in a post-Kantian world, but developmentally, allowing the natural 
philosopher to mediate his necessity and circumstance to explore the infinity within 
himself as well as that in Nature. 
Since according to Spinoza, infinity in Nature could not be perceived whole, 
Goethe’s natural philosophy sought to unite its diverse forms and transcend the gap that 
existed between percept and concept. As Heller noted, Goethe himself reported in his 
diary an occasion on which he discussed this view of science with Schiller, particularly 
with respect to his morphological ideas, and insisted that ‘perhaps there was still the 
possibility of another method, one that would not tackle Nature by merely dissecting and 
particularizing, but show her at work and alive, manifesting herself in her wholeness in 
every single part of her being’.58  
Indeed, Goethe insisted that such a method could emerge from experience itself. 
As Goethe noted in the Italian Journey, one could perceive all of the particular plant 
forms as morphologically variable expressions of a universal plant principle that 
functioned in a telic manner in response to the constraints of different environments. Here 
the mixing and respective modification of Goethe’s views of Spinoza’s and Kant’s 
epistemologies are most apparent. It is from the mixing of the intuitive and conceptual 
foundations of experience, that truthful, of the same kind of truth as in Dichtung und 
Wahrheit, science could be painted. While Spinoza pretended to do without hypotheses, 
dismissing the productive role of the imagination altogether, Kant favored the 
subsumption of the particular and uniquely situated experience of the natural world under 
the universal cognitive conditions that, albeit differently from the Spinozistic distortion, 
                                                 
58 E. Heller, The Disinherited Mind, New York, 1975, 6. 
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just as critically warp the work of a Goethean natural philosopher who seeks to 
understand the general principles of organization of the natural world. In contrast, 
Goethe, who in Werther’s complementarily polarized yellow coat and blue frock,59 
experienced Nature interjectively, in the duality of object and subject, at the interface of 
percept and concept—bordering light and dark—and creating colour.  
                                                 
59 J. W. von Goethe, The Sorrows of Young Werther, (tr. B. Pike), New York, 2004. 
